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Abstract 
 
Many governments have placed priority on excellence in higher education as part of 
their policy agendas. Processes for recruitment and career advancement in universities 
thus have a critical role. The efficiency of faculty selection processes can be evaluated 
by comparing the subsequent performance of competition winners against that of the 
losers and the pre-existing staff of equal academic rank. Our study presents an empirical 
analysis concerning the recruitment procedures for associate professors in the Italian 
university system. The results of a bibliometric analysis of the hard science areas reveal 
that new associate professors are on average more productive than the incumbents. 
However a number of crucial concerns emerge, in particular concerning occurrence of 
non-winner candidates that are more productive than the winners over the subsequent 
triennium, and cases of winners that are completely unproductive. Beyond the 
implications for the Italian case, the analysis offers considerations for all decision-
makers regarding the ex post evaluation of the efficiency of the recruitment process and 
the desirability of providing selection committees with bibliometric indicators in 
support of evaluation (i.e. informed peer review). 
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1. Introduction 
 
The recruitment and the selective advancement of university professors are crucial 
processes for the medium and long-term future of academic systems. These processes 
are even more important given the current development of the “world-class” university 
model, in which one of the essential attributes is concentration of talent (Mohrman et 
al., 2008; Salmi, 2009). Particularly in “Anglo-Saxon” higher education systems, top 
universities are in competition with one another to bring in the best teaching professors 
and researchers from home and abroad. Competitive mechanisms have developed 
naturally in the Anglo-Saxon nations, with long-standing evolution of national policies 
that favor the birth and development of a true higher-education market, while the excess 
of public control seen in many European nations has inhibited the initiation of true 
competitive mechanisms and led to the development of a generally undifferentiated 
higher education system that is unable to compete at a global level for access to 
economic and human resources (public and private funds; talented students, excellent 
faculty) (Veugelers and van der Ploeg, 2008). According to Auranen and Nieminen 
(2010), in countries such as Germany, Sweden and Denmark (the present authors would 
also add Italy), the distinction of different levels of excellence among universities is not 
immediate, due to an almost total lack of competition among the actors in the system. 
Yet in many European countries recruitment and advancement take place by rigid 
procedures, sometimes fixed at the national level, intended - at least in theory - to 
ensure that competitions select the best candidates for introduction into the system and 
for gradual stages of advancement. “In theory” should be noted: in the Italian case, for 
example, recruitment and career advancement do take place by such nationally 
organized competitions, yet it is far from rare to see cases of favoritism exposed in the 
press or even arrive before the courts (Zagaria, 2007; Perotti, 2008). 
Problems of fairness in selection procedures are certainly not limited to Italy: the 
international literature has dedicated considerable attention to the study of academic 
recruitment and promotion, largely regarding questions of gender and minority 
discrimination (Zinovyeva and Bagues, 2012; van den Brink et al., 2010; Cora-Bramble, 
2006; Price et al., 2005; Trotman et al., 2002; Stanley et al., 2007). One of the 
conclusions is that discriminatory phenomena seem to develop above all when 
evaluations are based on non-transparent criteria (Rees 2004; Ziegler 2001; Husu 2000; 
Ledwith and Manfredi 2000; Allen 1988). In effect, academic recruitment is often 
reported as an informal process in which a few powerful professors select new ones 
through cooptation mechanisms (van den Brink et al., 2010; Husu, 2000; Fogelberg et 
al., 1999; Evans, 1995). Such mechanisms often conceal the phenomenon of favoritism, 
which although it occurs world-wide has been intensively examined in only a few 
nations, including Turkey (Aydogan, 2012), Australia (Martin, 2009), Spain (Zinovyeva 
and Bagues, 2012) and Italy (Perotti, 2008). In Italy, there has recently been strong 
interest in the study of nepotism, which is a particular form of favoritism. While 
Allesina (2011) and Durante et al., (2011 and 2009) report the unequivocal detection of 
the phenomenon, Abramo et al. (2012a) are more cautious: they do not deny the 
presence of nepotism, however they show that the probability a “child” of a parent in 
the same university not meriting their position is equal to the probability of any “non-
child” not deserving their position. This result is in line with what emerges from many 
sociological studies (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Lentz and Laband, 1989; Simon et 
al., 1966), suggesting the possibility that “children” employed in the universities may 
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have in fact received a substantial amount of qualifying career-related knowledge from 
their parents. Whatever the case for nepotism, it does not deal with the concerns for 
other forms of favoritism that clearly distort faculty recruitment and career 
advancement, particularly in countries characterized by scarce intensity of competition 
among universities. Zinovyeva and Bagues (2012), in examining the phenomenon in the 
Spanish university system, concentrated on the role of connections between the 
candidates and the evaluators composing the examining boards that decide on academic 
promotions. They show that the future performance of candidates who were promoted 
and had a weak connection with the evaluators was better than that of their “non-
connected” colleagues. Conversely, successful candidates with a strong link to the 
evaluators register worse performance both before and after their promotion. 
The surveys and case evidence stimulate reflection on the ex-post evaluation of the 
efficiency of recruitment processes in the academic world. After a certain passage of 
time from recruitment or advancement in a career it is in fact possible to quantify the 
“returns” through comparative evaluation of what the academics have achieved in the 
scientific research sphere2. In this work we thus propose to evaluate the efficiency of the 
selection process for academic career advancement, referring to the Italian university 
system and in particular to the competitions for associate professor positions (a total of 
1,232 posts) held in 2008. We use the bibliometric approach for the evaluation, and for 
reasons of significance limit the field of observations to the hard sciences. The 
evaluation is conducted by means of productivity indicators based on scientific 
publications indexed in the Thomson Reuters Web of Science (WoS). 
The next section of the paper describes relevant characteristics of the Italian higher 
education system and the procedures for faculty recruitment, particularly those adopted 
for the 2008 selections of associate professors. Section 3 illustrates the details of the 
methodology and dataset used for the analysis. Section 4 presents the results of the 
analysis in two subsections: first comparing the performance of competition winners 
and that of associate professors already on staff over the triennium following the 2008 
selections; second providing a comparison of the bibliometric productivity of the 
winners compared to that of the other participants in the competitions, again over the 
triennium that followed the selections. The work concludes with a summary of the 
results and the authors’ considerations. 
 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1 The Italian higher education system 
 
In Italy, the Ministry of Education, Universities and Research (MIUR) recognizes a 
total of 96 universities as having the authority to issue legally-recognized degrees. 
Twenty-nine of these are small-sized, private, special-focus universities, of which 13 
offer only e-learning. Sixty-seven are public and generally multi-disciplinary 
universities, scattered throughout the nation. Six of them are Scuole Superiori (Schools 
for Advanced Studies), specifically devoted to highly talented students, with very small 
faculties and tightly limited enrolment numbers per degree program. In the overall 
                                                          
2 The comparative evaluation of teaching activity is generally more difficult, although we can assume a 
significant correlation between teaching and research, particularly since quality in teaching will in part 
follow from scientific merit.  
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system, 94.9% of faculty are employed in public universities (0.5% in Scuole 
Superiori). Public universities are largely financed by government through non-
competitive allocation. Up to 2009, the core government funding (56% of universities’ 
total income) was input oriented, i.e. independent of merit, and distributed to 
universities in a manner intended to equally satisfy the needs of each and all, in function 
of their size and disciplines of research. It was only following the first national research 
evaluation exercise (VTR), conducted between 2004 and 2006, that a minimal share, 
equivalent to 3.9% of total income, was attributed by the MIUR in function of the 
assessment of research and teaching quality. 
Despite some intervention intended to grant increased autonomy and responsibilities 
to the universities (Law 168 of 19893), the Italian higher education system is a long-
standing, classic example of a public and highly centralized governance structure, with 
low levels of autonomy at the university level and a very strong role played by the 
central state. 
In keeping with the Humboldtian model, there are no “teaching-only” universities in 
Italy, as all professors are required to carry out both research and teaching. Time 
devoted to teaching is established by law: each faculty member must allocate a 
minimum of 350 hours per year to this area. At the close of 2012, there were 57,400 
faculty members in Italy (full, associate and assistant professors) and a roughly equal 
number of technical-administrative staff. All new personnel enter the university system 
through public examinations, and career advancement can only proceed by further 
public examinations, as indicated in the next section. 
Salaries are regulated at the centralized level and are calculated according to role 
(administrative, technical, or professorial), rank within role (for example: assistant, 
associate or full professor) and seniority. None of a professor’s salary depends on merit. 
Moreover, as in all Italian public administration, dismissal of an employee for lack of 
productivity is unheard of. 
The whole of these conditions have created an environment and culture that are 
completely non-competitive, yet flourishing with favoritism and other opportunistic 
behaviors that are dysfunctional to the social and economic roles of the higher education 
system. The overall result is a system of universities that are almost completely 
undifferentiated for quality and prestige, with the exception of the tiny Scuole Superiori 
and a very small number of private, special-focus universities. The system is thus 
unable to attract significant foreign faculty (or students). The numbers are negligible: 
only 1.8% of research staff are foreign nationals. This is a system where every 
university has some share of top scientists, flanked by another share of absolute non-
producers. Over the 2004-2008 period, 6,640 (16.8%) of the 39,512 hard-sciences 
professors did not publish any scientific articles in the journals indexed by the WoS. 
Another 3,070 professors (7.8%) did achieve publication, but their work was never cited 
(Abramo et al., 2013a). In bibliometric terms, it means that 9,710 individuals (24.6%) 
had no impact on scientific progress, as measurable through bibliometric databases4. An 
                                                          
3 This law was intended to grant increased autonomy and responsibility to the universities to establish 
their own organizational frameworks, including charters and regulations. Subsequently, Law 537 (Article 
5) of 1993 and Decree 168 of 1996 provided further changes intended to increase university involvement 
in overall decision-making on use of resources, and to encourage individual institutions to operate on the 
market and reach their own economic and financial equilibrium. 
4 Researchers that we define “unproductive” may actually publish in international journals not indexed by 
Web of Science, or codify the new knowledge produced in different forms, such as books, patents, etc. 
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almost equal 23% of professors alone produced 77% of the overall Italian scientific 
advancement. This 23% of “top” faculty is not concentrated in a limited number of 
universities, but is instead dispersed more or less uniformly among all Italian 
universities, along with the unproductive ones, so that no single institution reaches the 
critical mass of excellence necessary to develop as an elite university and compete at the 
international level (Abramo et al., 2012b). 
 
 
2.2 Recruitment and career advancement 
 
In Italy, the recruitment and career advancement of professors are regulated by 
specific law, with its implementation being the responsibility of the MIUR. There have 
been major reforms of the norms over recent years, with the last one brought about by 
Law 240 of 2010, which introduced a double level of evaluation for selection of 
associate and full professors. The first level is national, managed directly by the 
Ministry, intended to indicate all those candidates with sufficient qualifications in terms 
of the scientific activity they have conducted; the second is managed by the individual 
universities and is for the selection of those that are best suited to the specific needs of 
the university, from among those first judged sufficient at the national level. Prior to 
Law 240, the processes of recruitment and career advancement were completely in the 
hands of the individual universities, and in fact the new selection system is still in the 
start-up phase. 
The ex-post analysis of the results of the 2008 competitions is clearly of interest, 
because not only was this the year the last of the era of exclusively “local” competitions, 
but also because recruitment procedures had been completely halted for the preceding 
full three years. For this reason there were competitions launched for thousands of 
positions, and as these were completed over the next years, the arrivals and 
advancements of a mass of professors equal to 10% of the total national faculty (12.8% 
solely among associate professors). 
Up until and including 2008, universities would recruit the research and teaching 
faculty to fill their needs through individual competitions, following the procedures 
dictated at the central level. These required identification of a committee to judge the 
curricula of the competition participants and thus choose the best candidates to fill the 
open position. Each committee was to be composed of five full professors, of which one 
was designated by the university holding the competition and the other four were 
chosen from a short list of other full professors in the discipline concerned. The short 
list was in turn established by national voting among all the full professors of the 
discipline. The candidate evaluations carried out by each committee were to be based 
on: 
 examination of the documented qualifications presented by each candidate, 
 results of an interview held to better understand the candidate’s career profile. 
For the recruitment of associate professors, the evaluation also included a test of 
their teaching skill to identify their suitability as an educator in the disciplinary sector. 
The law required that the selection committees evaluate the candidates’ research 
activity on the basis of specific criteria, including: innovation, originality and 
methodological validity of the scientific production; contribution to work completed in 
collaboration with others; conformity of the candidate’s research history with the 
scientific discipline indicated by the competition; scientific relevance of the journals or 
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other media for their publications, and their resulting diffusion within the scientific 
community; timeliness of the scientific production in relation to the evolution of 
knowledge in the disciplinary sector. The personal documentation to be evaluated was 
to concern: history of teaching activity; employment service in national and foreign 
universities and research institutes; organization, direction and coordination of research 
groups and/or initiatives in teaching and research. 
After individual and joint judgments of all the candidates, the committee members 
as a group were required to vote for selection of two winning candidates5. At that point 
the university that held the competition was free to hire one of the two winners for the 
announced position while the other remained eligible for hiring over the next five years, 
in analogous rank and without further competition, by any other university in the 
national system. 
In order to rationalize the process of the individual competitions over the entire 
system, the MIUR monitored and gathered the hiring proposals of the various 
universities and supported the evaluation procedures through information management 
aimed at better guaranteeing transparency. One of the ministry measures was to provide 
a Web portal with all the basic information on the competition procedures, posts 
available, numbers of candidates for each competition, the scheduling of the procedures 
and final results. 
The transparency provisions, nomination of a national committee of experts in the 
sector, and the timely issue of regulations for the evaluation procedures were all 
intended to ensure efficient processes and the achievement of the desired objectives. In 
reality, the characteristics of Italian system - such as the generally strong inclination to 
favoritism, the structured absence of responsibility for poor performance by research 
units, and the lack of incentive schemes for merit - undermined the credibility of 
selection procedures for hiring and advancement of university personnel, just as 
happens for the public administration in general. This is demonstrated by the high and 
growing number of legal cases brought by losing candidates and by specific studies of 
the systemic problems (Perotti, 2008; Zagaria, 2007) - and last but not least by the 
unavoidable evidence of the 25% of professors that are unproductive. 
Now that some years have passed since the 2008 event of 1,232 competitions for 
career advancement, we take the notable opportunity of evaluating the efficiency of the 
selection process, relative to the results of scientific activity achieved over the 
subsequent triennium. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Measuring research performance at individual level 
 
Research activity is a production process in which the inputs consist of human, 
tangible (scientific instruments, materials, etc.) and intangible (accumulated knowledge, 
social networks, etc.) resources, and where outputs have a complex character of both 
tangible nature (publications, patents, conference presentations, databases, protocols, 
etc.) and intangible nature (tacit knowledge, consulting activity, etc.). The new-
knowledge production function has therefore a multi-input and multi-output character. 
                                                          
5 The committees could also indicate a single winner, however in reality this occurred very rarely. 
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The principal efficiency indicator of any production system is labor productivity. To 
calculate it one needs to adopt a few simplifications and assumptions. 
It has been shown (Moed, 2005) that in the hard sciences the prevalent form of 
codification of research output is publication in scientific journals. As a proxy of total 
output, in this work we consider only publications (articles, article reviews, and 
proceeding papers) indexed in the WoS. The other forms of output which we neglect are 
often followed by publications that describe their content in the scientific arena, so the 
analysis of publications alone actually avoids a potential double counting. 
When measuring labor productivity, if there are differences in the production factors 
available to each scientist then one should normalize by them. Unfortunately relevant 
data are not available at individual level in Italy. The first assumption then is that the 
resources available to professors within the same field of observation are the same. The 
second assumption is that the hours devoted to research are more or less the same for all 
professors. Given the main traits of the Italian academic system as depicted in section 
2.1, the above assumptions appear acceptable. 
Because of the differences in the publication intensity across fields, a prerequisite of 
any research performance assessment free of distortions is a classification of each 
researcher in one and only one field (Abramo et al., 2013b). In the Italian university 
system all professors are classified in one field (named scientific disciplinary sectors - 
SDSs, 370 in all), grouped into disciplines (named university disciplinary areas - UDAs, 
14 in all)6. To our knowledge, this feature of the Italian higher education system is 
unique in the world. Furthermore, since it has been demonstrated that productivity of 
full, associate and assistant professors is different (while their distribution is not 
uniform across universities, and academic rank determines differentiation in salaries) in 
order to avoid distortions in performance rankings (Abramo et al., 2010a), we 
differentiate them by academic rank. 
A very gross way to calculate the average yearly labor research productivity of a 
scientist is to simply count publications (O, output) in the period of observation and 
divide it by the full-time equivalent of work in the period. A more sophisticated way 
recognizes that publications, embedding the new knowledge produced, have different 
values that bibliometricians approximate with citations. In very specific cases, when the 
time window between citations count and publication date is short (two years or 
shorter), it has been shown that IF is a better proxy of expected impact than citations 
(Abramo et al., 2010b). In all other cases, the use of citations must be always preferred 
(Abramo et al., 2011). In our specific case, because we measure productivity in the 
2009-2011 period and the available citations were observed on 31/12/2011, we had to 
resort to the impact factor of journals to proxy the value of publications. 
Since citation behavior and consequently impact factors vary across fields, and it has 
been shown (Abramo and D’Angelo, 2011) that it is not unlikely that researchers 
belonging to a particular scientific field may also publish outside that field7, we must 
standardize impact values with respect to a scaling factor pertaining to the distribution 
for the same year and subject category8. Because of the constraint of the very short 
citation window, for this specific study, we substitute citations with the impact factor in 
                                                          
6 The complete list is accessible on http://attiministeriali.miur.it/UserFiles/115.htm, last accessed on 
March 4, 2013. 
7 A typical example is statisticians, who may apply their theory to medicine, physics, social sciences, etc. 
8 For details, see Abramo et al., 2013b. 
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the formula of the productivity indicator, Fractional Scientific Strength, FSS, that we 
normally use (Abramo et al., 2013b). To highlight the difference, we add a subscript IF: 
𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐹 =  
 1
𝑡
∑
𝐼𝐹𝑖
𝐼𝐹̅̅ ?̅?
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑓𝑖 
Where: 
𝐼𝐹𝑖 = journal impact factor of publication i; 
𝐼𝐹̅̅ ?̅?= average impact factor of all journals in the same subject category of publication i; 
𝑓𝑖 = fractional contribution of the researcher to the publication i. Fractional contribution 
equals the inverse of the number of authors, in those fields where authors appear in 
alphabetical order in the byline, but assumes different weights in the life sciences, 
where we give different weights to each co-author according to their order in the 
byline and the character of the co-authorship (intra-mural or extra-mural)9 (see 
Abramo et al., 2013c); 
N = number of publications of the researcher in the period of observation; 
t = number of years of work of the researcher in the period of observation. 
 
 
3.2 Dataset 
 
Data on faculty of each university and their SDS classification are extracted from the 
database on Italian university personnel maintained by the MIUR10. The bibliometric 
dataset used to measure O and FSSIF is extracted from the Italian Observatory of Public 
Research (ORP), a database developed and maintained by the authors, derived under 
license from the WoS. Beginning from the raw data of the WoS, and applying a 
complex algorithm for reconciliation of the author’s affiliation and disambiguation of 
the true identity of the authors, each publication (article, article review and conference 
proceeding) is attributed to the university scientist or scientists that produced it 
(D’Angelo et al., 2011). Thanks to this algorithm we can produce rankings of research 
productivity at the individual level, on a national scale. Based on the value of O and 
FSSIF we obtain, for each SDS, a ranking list expressed in percentiles and differentiated 
by academic rank. Thus the performance of each scientist is expressed on a scale of 0-
100 (worst to best), comparing to the performance of all Italian colleagues of the same 
SDS and academic rank. In the current study we use both indicators of performance: the 
intermediate, inaccurate O and the more sophisticated and accurate FSSIF, embedding 
both the standardized impact of output and the fractional contribution of authors. In this 
manner we can search for evidence of the potential difficulties and shortcomings of the 
committees in carrying out efficient selections - in their case without support from 
bibliometric measures (informed peer review). 
                                                          
9 If first and last authors belong to the same university, 40% of the contribution is assigned to each of 
them; the remaining 20% is divided among all other authors. If the first two and last two authors belong 
to different universities, 30% of the contribution is assigned to first and last authors; 15% is attributed to 
second and last author but one; the remaining 10% is divided among all others. The weighting values 
were assigned following advice from senior Italian professors in the life sciences. The values could be 
changed to suit different practices in other national contexts. 
10 http://cercauniversita.cineca.it, last accessed on March 4, 2013. 
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Overall in 2008, 1,232 competitions for associate professor positions11 were 
launched by a total of 74 universities. Table 1 provides the details per individual UDA. 
In total the competitions concerned 299 SDSs. At the end of all the processes, which 
lasted an average of over two years12, the committees had named 2,339 winners, out of a 
total of 16,500 candidates. The comparison between the last two columns of the table 
clearly shows the impact of the 2008 round of competitions. The ratio of number of 
winners of competitions to the size of the existing teaching Italian faculty averages 
12.8%, varying from a minimum of 8.7% in Earth sciences to a maximum of 21% in 
Law. In five UDAs the applications received were numerically higher than the number 
of permanent faculty at the time. For Industrial and information engineering, compared 
to 1,493 associate professors on faculty, there were 2,010 applications for 144 
competitions launched by 31 universities. 
 
Table 1: Data on year 2008 competitions for associate professor posts, per UDA 
UDA 
Compet. 
launched 
SDSs 
concerned 
Univ. 
launching 
compet. 
Applications 
submitted 
Winners* 
Associate 
prof. on 
staff 
2008 
Mathematics and computer 
science 
59 
9 out of 
10 
26 1,404 114 1,092 
Physics 46 6 out of 8 24 1,102 90 891 
Chemistry 55 
11 out of 
12 
24 766 104 1,040 
Earth sciences 20 
11 out of 
12 
12 268 37 423 
Biology 75 
18 out of 
19 
33 1,387 147 1,517 
Medicine 168 
44 out of 
50 
35 2,338 316 3,298 
Agricultural and veterinary 
sciences 
56 
24 out of 
30 
21 460 107 939 
Civil engineering and 
architecture 
86 
20 out of 
22 
30 1,291 161 1,201 
Industrial and information 
engineering 
144 
36 out of 
42 
31 2,010 279 1,493 
Ancient history, philology, 
literature 
and art history 
103 
41 out of 
77 
32 943 192 1,794 
History, philosophy, pedagogy 
and psychology 
118 
30 out of 
34 
42 1249 220 1,547 
Law 128 
21 out of 
21 
49 1148 245 1,169 
Economics and statistics 133 
17 out of 
19 
43 1720 250 1,341 
Political and social sciences 41 
11 out of 
14 
23 483 77 512 
Total 1,232 
299 out 
of 370 
74 16,569 2,339 18,257 
* The data indicate the results declared from the 1,221 competition procedures that were officially 
completed (out of 1,232 launched) at the time of preparing the current research paper. 
                                                          
11 Retrieved from: http://reclutamento.murst.it/, the open Web site managed by the MIUR, titled 
“Comparative evaluation in the recruitment of University Professors and Researchers (Law 3, 3 July 
1998, no. 210)”. 
12 At the time of the current research, eleven competitions had not been completed.  
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To ensure the representativity of publications as proxy of the research output, our 
analysis is focused on the competitions concerning SDSs where at least 50% of 
professors produced at least one publication indexed in the WoS over the period 2004-
2008. With these restrictions, the analysis is limited to 654 competitions concerning 193 
SDSs (185 belonged to the nine UDAs listed in Table 1; we arbitrarily group the 
remaining eight13 as the generic UDA “Other”). All of the competitions but 39 
announced two winners. Of the total 1,269 winners, 91.3% (1,159) were academics 
already on staff as assistant professors. 
In order to compare the research productivity of the winners with that of the other 
applicants it was necessary to identify all the applicants, by reading the minutes of each 
competition (published on-line by the individual universities). Given the prohibitive 
scope of this task, we selected 287 competitions (44% of the total 654) that were 
organized by 12 universities: the four institutions with the highest numbers of launched 
competitions from each of the northern, central and southern national areas. The data for 
this subset are presented in Table 2. For this subpopulation, the winners (550 in all) 
represent 22% of the total candidates (2,590); the rate of selection was slightly more 
favorable for incumbent assistant professors from Italian universities 
(532/2,314=23.0%) than it was for other candidates (18/276=6.5%). On average there 
were nine participants per competition, of which eight were Italian-national academics. 
However the number of candidates shows significant variation (Std Dev. 5.6), with 16 
competitions where there were 20 or more candidates and one that reached the level of 
29 candidates. 
 
Table 2: Winners and candidates of 287 competitions examined in detail 
   
 Candidates per competition 
 
Winners Non winners Total candidates Average Median Std Dev. Max 
Italian academics 532 1,782 2,314 8 7 5.4 28 
Others 18 258 276 1 1 1.2 6 
Total 550 2,040 2,590 9 8 5.6 29 
 
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
In this section we evaluate the scientific productivity of the winners of the 2008 
competitions over the 2009-2011 triennium, in comparison to performance by: 
 associate professors on staff in 2008; 
 other applicants to the competitions, on staff as assistant professors. 
The decision to evaluate performance over the post-competition triennium arises from 
the general interest in analyzing the capacity of nominated committees to evaluate, “on 
the ground”, the best candidates in terms of their potential future scientific productivity. 
By comparing the performance of the winners against that of the incumbent associate 
professors we intend to identify if the winners effectively reach levels of productivity 
that are adequate to the academic ranks for which they were chosen. By comparing 
between the performance of the winners and that of the “non-winners”, our intention is 
to understand if the committees’ personnel choices have proven correct in terms of the 
                                                          
13 M-PSI/01: General Psychology; M-PSI/02: Psychobiology and Physiological Psychology; M-PSI/03: 
Psychometrics; M-EDF/01: Teaching Methods for Physical Activities; M-EDF/02: Teaching Methods for 
Sport; SECS-P/05: Econometrics; SECS-S/01: Statistics; SECS-S/06: Mathematics for Economics, 
Actuarial Studies and Finance. 
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expected scientific results. In the analysis we use both of the productivity indicators (O 
and FSSIF) as defined above. For both indicators, each scientist’s performance is 
expressed on a scale of 0-100 (worst to best), comparing to the performance of all 
Italian colleagues of the same SDS and academic rank. Because of the limits of WoS 
coverage and the approximations embedded in bibliometrics indicators and methods, 
our findings need to be interpreted with special caution. 
 
 
4.1 Research performance of winners as compared to that of incumbent associate 
professors 
 
To ensure greater significance for this first analysis we consider only professors that 
were on staff for all three years from to 2009 to 2011 (Table 3). 
Considering the output indicator (O), the average percentile rank of the winners is 
67.1, compared to 49.1 for the incumbent associate professors. For fractional scientific 
strength (FSSIF), the average percentile is 63.5 for winners and 46.1 for incumbents. 
The Student’s t-test for significance in the differences gave positive results (two tailed 
P-value < 0.01). The share of winners with no publications is 4.5% of total, compared to 
16.0% of the incumbents; the share of winners with publications in journals with no 
impact (FSSIF = 0) is 5.5%, compared to 18.2% of the incumbents. Considering FSSIF, 
8.3% of the winners place in the bottom 20% of scientists in each SDS and 28.9% have 
performance below the median, compared to 26.0% and 52.2% for the incumbents. 
34.6% of the winners place in the top 20% scientists, compared to 18.5% of the 
incumbents. Raising the threshold to the top 10% of scientists, we see that 19.2% of the 
winners belong to the “excellent” category, compared to only 9.4% of incumbents. 
 
Table 3: Comparison of 2009-2011 research performance (FSSIF) by winners and incumbents 
 
Winners Incumbents 
Observations 1,154* 9,297 
Average percentile rank for O 67.1 49.1 
Average percentile rank for FSSIF 63.5 46.1 
Professors with no publications (%) 4.5 16.0 
Professors with no impact (%) 5.5 18.2 
Bottom 20% scientists for FSSIF (%) 8.3 26.0 
Below median for FSSIF (%) 28.9 52.2 
Top 20% scientists for FSSIF (%) 34.6 18.5 
Top 10% scientists for FSSIF (%) 19.2 9.4 
* The difference from the total set of 1,159 academic winners (Section 3.2) is due to five assistant 
professors who won two different competitions: here they are counted only once. 
 
The comparison between research performance (FSSIF) of winners and of 
incumbents broken down by UDA (Table 4) again shows significant differences 
according to Student’s t-test (all two tailed p-value < 0.01). The most notable difference 
in productivity between winners and incumbents is in the Mathematics and computer 
science UDA: for the winners the average percentile rank is 69.3, while for the 
incumbents it is 42.7. The difference is also notable in the Earth sciences UDA: for the 
winners the average percentile rank is 68.6, compared to 45.6 for incumbents. The UDA 
showing the least difference is Biology: for the winners the average percentile rank 
equals 60.9 and for the incumbents it equals 48.3. 
The Civil engineering and architecture UDA is the one with the highest share of 
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winning professors with no publications (14.0%), and with no publications in journals 
with impact factor (16.0%)14. This is also a UDA where the incumbent population as a 
whole has very high non-productive shares (respectively 32.3% and 36.9%). Biology 
and Chemistry are the two UDAs with the highest share of winners with FSSIF below 
the median: 34.1% for Biology and 33.7% for Chemistry. 
 
Table 4: Comparison of 2009-2011 research performance (FSSIF) of winners (W) and incumbents (I) 
by UDA 
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UDA W I W I W I W I W I W I 
Agricultural and veterinary 
sciences 
90 610 63.1 45.8 3.3 15.7 3.3 16.7 28.9 52.5 33.3 18.7 
Biology 132 1,262 60.9 48.3 2.3 9.7 3.0 9.9 34.1 51.3 34.8 18.8 
Chemistry 95 880 64.4 48.2 0.0 6.3 0.0 6.5 33.7 51.5 35.8 18.5 
Civil engineering and 
architecture 
50 347 62.8 41.2 14.0 32.3 16.0 36.9 24.0 53.9 30.0 19.0 
Earth sciences 31 294 68.6 45.6 3.2 19.4 3.2 21.4 22.6 52.0 41.9 18.4 
Industrial and information 
engineering 
264 1,287 63.2 44.2 4.2 16.3 6.1 23.6 29.2 53.8 33.3 17.6 
Mathematics and computer 
science 
108 890 69.3 42.7 3.7 26.0 8.3 31.2 22.2 53.1 46.3 17.0 
Medicine 239 2,601 63.2 47.3 5.4 15.1 5.4 15.7 27.2 51.7 33.1 19.1 
Physics 77 724 62.7 48.2 1.3 9.5 1.3 10.1 32.5 51.7 31.2 18.9 
Other 68 402 60.1 40.9 13.2 35.6 13.2 38.1 30.9 52.5 29.4 18.9 
 
The data presented above clearly show that in the triennium following the 
competitions, the winners performed better than their colleagues already on staff, in 
terms of scientific productivity. However the average values do not disguise cases of 
inadequacy among the winners: among these, 4.5% did not produce any publications 
from 2009 to 2011 and a further 1% published only in journals with no impact factor. 
Given these situations of unexpected results from certain competitions, we conducted a 
further analysis. Table 5 shows the number of competitions (absolute and as % of total) 
where the winners were unproductive (output=0; or FSSIF=0), placed in the bottom 
20%, or placed below the median. Research performance is again measured with the 
two productivity indicators O and FSSIF over the 2009-2011 period. For reasons of 
significance we analyze only the competitions were both winners were on staff over all 
three years from 2009 to 2011, for a total of 513 observations out of the starting 654 . 
For 8.4% of the competitions (43 out of 513), at least one winner produced no 
publications over the 2009-2011 period; in a further 2.3% of cases (12 of the 
competitions) at least one winner did publish but only in journals with no impact factor. 
                                                          
14 In this UDA WoS coverage is quite limited, which shows in a very high number of non-productive (in 
bibliometric terms) professors. In this UDA, our findings need to be interpreted with additional special 
caution. 
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The competitions where at least one winner placed in the bottom 20% number 60 of 
total 513 (11.7%) as measured by indicator O, and 80 (15.6%) on the basis of FSSIF. In 
39.8% of the competitions (204 out of 513), at least one winner registers O below the 
median and in 48.1% of the competitions (247 su 513) at least one winner shows FSSIF 
below the median. Particularly striking cases are those where both of the competition 
winners went on to produce no publications over the next three years and three 
competitions where both winners register nil FSSIF. 
 
Table 5: Distribution of 2008 competition winners for scientific productivity over the 2009-2011 period 
Competitions 
O FSSIF 
At least one Both At least one Both 
With unproductive winners 
43 of 513 
(8.4%) 
1 of 513 
(0.2%) 
55 of 513 
(10.7%) 
3 of 513 
(0.6%) 
With winners in bottom 20% 
60 of 513 
(11.7%) 
2 of 513 
(0.4%) 
80 of 513 
(15.6%) 
3 of 513 
(0.6%) 
With winners below the median 
204 of 513 
(39.8%) 
26 of 513 
(5.1%) 
247 of 513 
(48.1%) 
48 of 513 
(9.4%) 
 
In terms of output, the average performance of the two winners is below the median 
in 86 competitions out of 513, or 16.8% of total (Table 6); considering FSSIF, we see the 
same characteristic in 126 out of 513 competitions (one quarter of total). Another, 
certainly interesting situation is that where performance of one winner is below median, 
while at the same time the other performs in the top 20%. This occurs in 14.8% of cases 
(76 competitions out of 513) for indicator O, and in 90 competitions (17.5% of cases) 
for FSSIF. 
 
Table 6: Analysis of 2008 competitions on the basis of performance by the winners, 2009-2011 
Competitions O FSSIF 
Where average performance of 
the winners is below the median 
86 of 513 (16.8%) 126 of 513 (24.6%) 
With one winner in bottom 20% 
and the other top 20% 
21 of 513 (4.1%) 23 of 513 (4.5%) 
With one winner below median 
the other in top 20% 
76 of 513 (14.8%) 90 of 513 (17.5%) 
 
 
4.2 Research performance of winners as compared to that of other candidates 
 
The analyses in the preceding section show that over the triennium considered, the 
scientific activity of competition winners was an average greater than that of colleagues 
who were already on staff as associate professors, however there is no lack of cases 
where the productivity of winners falls below. We could imagine that in some 
competitions all the candidates had a low scientific profile and the committees, having 
in any case to proceed, would use comparative evaluation to choose the “best from the 
bad”. We return to this potential scenario in the conclusions to our paper; however, 
whatever the range of candidates in the competitions, we wish to compare the scientific 
productivity of the winners with that of other candidates, to understand the frequency of 
cases where committees made an inefficient selection. To do this it was first necessary 
to select a sample of competitions, given that the identification of the true candidates 
can only be accomplished by the labor-intensive scrutiny of all the individual 
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Committee minutes, to reveal those candidates who were actually subject to evaluation, 
from among all those who initially applied15. For this analysis we thus refer to the subset 
of 287 competitions indicated in Table 2, meaning those launched by the four northern, 
central and southern universities that were most active in conducting competitions. Of 
these 287 competitions, there are 205 with at least one “non-winner” participant that can 
be considered in our evaluation16, and 196 with at least two non-winner participants. 
Table 7 presents the number of competitions where at least one or two non-winner 
participants had O or FSSIF greater than one or both the winners, over the 2009-
2011period. 
There are 178 out of 204 (87.3%) competitions where at least one non-winner 
achieved greater output than at least one winner over the subsequent triennium. 
Considering FSSIF, the number of such competitions rises to 182 (89.2%). In 74 
competitions of 196 (37.8%), at least two non-winners achieved greater output than 
both winners. For FSSIF, the number of competitions rises to 75 (38.3%). 
In 167 competitions out of 204 (81.9%) there was at least one non-winner 
participant who was more productive than a winner, for both indicators, and in 131 
competitions of 196 (66.8%) at least two non-winners achieved higher productivity than 
a winner, again for both indicators. In 83 of 204 competitions (40.7%) at least one non-
winner obtained a rank for both indicators higher than that of both the winners; in 50 
competitions of 196 (25.5%), there were at least two non-winners with both indicators 
of performance higher than those of both winners. 
 
Table 7: Number (percentage) of competitions in which at least one or two participants had 
performance greater than one or both winners 
Competitions O FSSIF Both O and FSSIF 
Where at least one participant had performance 
greater than at least one winner 
178 of 204 
(87.3%) 
182 of 204 
(89.2%) 
167 of 204 
(81.9%) 
Where at least two participants had performance 
greater than at least one winner 
140 of 196 
(71.4%) 
153 of 196 
(78.1%) 
131 of 196 
(66.8%) 
Where at least one participant had performance 
greater than both winners 
111 of 204 
(54.4%) 
120 of 204 
(58.8%) 
83 of 204 
(40.7%) 
Where at least two participants had performance 
greater than both winners 
74 of 196 
(37.8%) 
75 of 196 
(38.3%) 
50 of 196 
(25.5%) 
 
Figure 1 provides further detail concerning Table 7, showing the number of 
competitions where 1, 2, … n non-winner candidates outperformed one or both winners. 
The analysis reveals many situations of inefficient selection, in other words 
competitions where a substantial number of participants went on to achieve greater 
scientific productivity than the winners. For example, we observe 22 competitions (of 
204 analyzed) where not less than 10 participants register productivity higher than that 
of one of the winners (last light-colored bar of the histogram), or the case of the 30 
competitions where not less than five participants register productivity higher than both 
winners (aggregation of all dark-shaded bars, axis “5” and up). The data are that much 
more significant if we consider that the number of candidates per competition (while not 
uniform) is on average quite low: as indicated in Table 2, there were an average of nine 
                                                          
15 The number of candidates that actually arrived at the stage of committee evaluation was consistently 
less than the initial applicants, especially in SDSs where many universities launched competitions.  
16 For our own evaluation, there must be at least one non-winner who held the role of assistant professor 
over the subsequent triennium, for at least one year. 
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applicants per competition and of these there were an average of only 8 (academic) 
candidates that could be included in our analysis. 
 
 
Figure 1: Number of competitions where “non-winner” participants show higher productivity (FSSIF) 
than winners 
 
Even though the bibliometric methodology adopted would have evident limits in 
simulating the complex evaluation mechanisms that committees might have 
implemented, to select the individuals best-suited as associate professors from among 
all the candidates, the results of the analyses show without doubt that in the triennium 
following the competitions the non-winners very often had research productivity that 
was clearly higher than that of winners. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Recruitment and career advancement are highly critical processes for any productive 
system: even more so for higher education systems, where many nations are investing 
substantial resources, in spite of the economic downturn, specifically to relaunch their 
economies. The efficiency of these processes can be evaluated by comparing the 
subsequent research performance of the recruitment “winners” with that of competition 
losers and pre-existing incumbents of equal academic rank. In Italy the last recruitment 
campaign for university faculty took place in 2008, mostly to fill associate professor 
positions from the ranks of assistants, with some competitions to rise from associate to 
full professor. The 2008 competitions gave rise to a massive renewal of faculty, with 
insertion of new associate professors totaling almost 13% of the staff already holding 
such academic rank. The current study evaluates the scientific activity of the 
competition winners over the triennium following the selections. 
A first analysis revealed that over the 2009-2011 period, the average performance of 
the winners was significantly higher than that of their colleagues who were already on 
staff as associate professors. However it also emerged that 29% of winners had 
productivity lower than the median in their SDS, and that 5.5% of winners did not 
achieve any citations indexed in WoS. The analysis of the single competitions shows 
that almost half of them selected at least one winner that achieved productivity below 
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the median for their field over the following triennium; in 10% of competitions this 
occurred for both winners. 
A deeper analysis for a subset of competitions, in which we identified all the 
candidates, shows that in two thirds of the cases at least two non-winner participants 
registered productivity greater than at least one of the winners. In fact in a quarter of the 
competitions, both winners showed productivity that was systematically lower than at 
least two non-winner participants. The inefficiencies observed in the selections are still 
more pronounced when we consider the more refined productivity indicator, FSSIF. The 
results raise questions about the general need to provide university recruitment 
committees with bibliometric indicators in support of their evaluations (informed peer 
review). 
We note that the 2008 Italian recruitment campaign was conducted under a 
regulatory framework that recent legislation has completely modified, including 
providing for new preselection mechanisms intended to reduce potential distortion 
phenomena inherent in peer evaluations. But it will take many years to understand if the 
new regulatory framework - which has still to be fully implemented - will solve the 
critical problems of the preceding one and guarantee efficient selection in the national 
academic system. The intention of the authors has not been to raise any doubts about 
ethical issues in the personnel selections made, only to understand to what extent the 
winners merited the trust of the committees that they would implement one of the 
fundamental missions of the academic system: knowledge advancement. 
Such university selection committees carry out their activity as shareholder 
delegates, which in the case of prevalently public systems such as in Italy, include all 
taxpayers. Given the facts of efficiency and issues of trust, our study has revealed 
several critical concerns that should now be further investigated relative to the mass of 
faculty inserted in the Italian academic system by the 2008 procedures. In particular, the 
authors perceive the necessity for further analysis of the determinants of the observed 
results. It should certainly be of interest to measure the scientific productivity of the 
evaluators, to attempt correlations with that of the winners. It also seems useful to 
investigate the presence of proximity effects that might have given advantage to 
candidates that were socially closer to one or more evaluators. Finally, it would appear 
useful to stratify the results of the analysis by geographic area, to detect potential 
regional peculiarities, as well as to repeat the analysis under the new recruitment system 
once it takes effect, to understand the depth and breadth of the resulting changes in the 
scientific profiles of the winners. 
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